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Internet mobile users are concernedmore andmore about their privacy nowadays as both researches and real world incidents show
that leaking of communication and location privacy can lead to serious consequence, and many research works have been done
to anonymize individual user from aggregated location data. However, just the communication itself between the mobile users
and their peers or website could collect considerable privacy of the mobile users, such as location history, to other parties. In this
paper, we investigated the potential privacy risk of mobile Internet users and proposed a scalable system built on top of public
cloud services that can hide mobile user’s network location and traffic from communication peers. This system creates a dynamic
distributed proxy network for each mobile user to minimize performance overhead and operation cost.
1. Introduction
Mobility support has been one hot topic for the last decades,
andmany designs are proposed aiming to implement an “any-
where, anytime” Internet connectivity experience. Although
research community provided a number of designs, such
as [1–3], today’s majority Internet mobility support is done
through cellular service providers: mobile device receives
a private IP address that is routable within cellular service
provider network, and Internet traffic will go through a
nearby cellular Internet Gateway to public Internet. The IP
address issued by cellular network is allowed to roam across
limited distance and time; until then a new IPwill be assigned
and may also be accompanied with changing of Gateway.
Existing connections have to be terminated then reinitiated
by the mobile devices. Due to the nature of intermittent con-
nection and nonpublic routable address behind the gateway,
it is difficult to resolve mobile device’s network location and
initiate a connection to it by peer host itself. To address
this issue, major mobile OS vendors and application vendors
implemented “push notification” to emulate an on-demand
message pushing service, such as Apple Push Notification
Service (APNS) [4], Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) [5],
or Microsoft Push Notification Service (MPNS) [6]. Under
the hood, mobile devices keep live connections with Push
service providers to receive real-time message. When one
mobile user wants to communicate with another user, the
message is delivered through either Push service, or leverage
Push service to bootstrap a direct connection betweenmobile
device and peer node.
Even though these existing infrastructures enabled var-
ious mobile applications today, it does not solve problems
including privacy vulnerability and lack of general reach-
ability. When a mobile node connects to its peers, connec-
tions are set up on its exposed public IP address, which is
either its actual public Internet attach point or a gateway
close to its physical location. That means from its exposed IP
address all of its peers can identify the approximate geolo-
cation of the mobile node. Even worse, peers not only can
track the trajectory of themobile node from its IP changes but
also can capture with high fidelity the movement timings to
preciselymodel the location history andmovement pattern of
the user using this mobile node. Those pieces of information
can be further used to project its future location statistically
[7–9]. On the one hand, this type of prediction can be useful
for certain purpose [10], but for a concerned privacy user, it
is not good news.
To protect privacy, existing research works had focused
on increasing anonymity of collected user location data [11],
limiting shared location information, or evaluating privacy
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exposure level before sharing location data [12].However how
to protect privacy for mobile node’s direct communication
did not draw equal attention. Unfortunately, any website can
track their user’s IP history and run all kinds of analysis and
data mining to model user’s behavior. Mobile applications
step one level further that can accurately track a single
user’s movement and can form a precise network address
timeline, even when application is not granted access to
GPS location. Additionally, any mobile app providing direct
communication exposes mobile node’s location history not
only to the mobile app vendor but also possibly to all other
contacts using the same app.
The general availability is another issue of cellular-based
Internet mobility. Besides not being available to devices that
are not cellular network equipped, Push notification systems
are centralized proprietary services that different systems are
not compatible with others. For example, to send a message
through APNS, both sender and receiver must be able to
talk to APNS and have APNS client installed. Also, the Push
sender must register with APNS priorly. A device with only
MPNS and another device only having APNS will not be able
to leverage Push service to communicate. To enable cross
Push system communication applications have tomanage the
identity mapping and communication channel translation
themselves with extra external services. Push notification as
an indirect communication mode, nevertheless, cannot solve
privacy issue solely. Due to the architecture limitation, it can
only be used to send a small piece of data, that is, 4 KB
as current standard. If peers want to use high-bandwidth
communication such as video stream, a direct connection not
through Push servicemust be created separately. Additionally
Push services are usually OS/vendor bounded and without
any legacy support. Existing applications cannot benefit
from Push service unless reconstructed. Usually, it is not
an easy task and expensive as communication model is
different.
VPN has become a popular service as more and more
Internet users start to concern about their privacy. Through
either private VPN service or multiple relay networks like
TOR, Internet users can hide where they are when they
communicate with peer hosts or websites and also obscure
who they talk to from their ISP. Limitations are that today’s
VPN services do not provide particular support of mobility
and add performance overhead as traffic always goes through
a static relay end host. The overhead will increase when the
mobile host moves to different network while still using the
same relay point. Additionally VPN services usually are not
designed to handle incoming connection well.
To solve these privacy and connectivity problems we
proposed a system that combines mobility support and proxy
and strategically creates a dynamic proxy network for a
mobile node to achieve the best balance between privacy,
performance, and cost. A centralized SDN controller man-
ages relay servers in multiple public cloud data centers, and
proxies are dynamically allocated on demand to form a proxy
network for each mobile node. All connections between the
mobile node and peer nodes are through proxies that are close
to peer nodes, and as a result both the real network location
and mobility characteristic are hidden completely from peer
nodes. Additionally mobile node can enjoy mobility support
on any Internet applications.
In the following sections, we discuss attack models of
privacy attacks in Section 2. Then in Section 3 we describe
the system design. Then we show results of preliminary
simulation in Section 4 and list related works in Section 5. At
last, we conclude in Section 6.
2. Privacy Attack Models
We assume Alice, the attack target, carrying a mobile device
with her all the time so that the network/geolocation of
her mobile node is approximate of Alice’s geolocation. The
adversary Bob wants to know Alice’s current geolocation and
location history so he can take advantage of that. The more
accurate location history Bob knows about Alice, the more
sophisticated attack he will be able to craft. In the following
sections, we list four major distinct attack models that Bob
can leverage to attack Alice’s privacy. Note that different
attack models could be combined in certain circumstances
to further enhance attack effects, as described in attack
scenarios.
2.1. AttackModel 1: Direct ConnectionAttack. By accomplish-
ing this type of attack, Bob can successfully directly connect
to Alice’s device and even maintain a connection to it. Attack
succeeds when connection can be set up successfully so that
Bob can acquire the current location of Alice. For protocols
only bound to a network location, such as TCP, an adversary
might need to perform further communication to confirm
Alice’s device identity. Identity bound protocols, such HIP,
may give Bob enough information for identify verification
with just connection attempt. There is one precondition of
this attack that Bob has to know Alice’s network location
before connecting.
2.2. Attack Model 2: Location Registry Attack. By accom-
plishing this type of attack, Bob can indirectly acquire
Alice’s network location from a registration service, such
as DNS, without direct interaction with mobile node. A
successful attack will reveal one temporary contact point
(not necessarily real network location of mobile node such
as when Proxy is leveraged) and give Bob chance of further
verifying by attempting direct connection. One precondition
of this attack is that Bob has to know Alice’s network identity
priorly.
2.3. Attack Model 3: Historical Location Attack. By accom-
plishing this type of attack Bob can collect a sequential list
of where Alice has been, which can be used to profile Alice
or aid other types of attacks. The sequence here is important
as the more precise the location sequence is, the better the
resolution of profiling adversary can be achieved. However
a location list with completely wrong sequence may still
be useful to Bob to some extent. The preconditions of this
attack are that (1) Bob has to know Alice’s network identity
priorly and (2) Bob can retrieve a subset list of Alice’s location
history.
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2.4. Attack Model 4: Location Change Timing Attack. By
accomplishing this type of attack, Bob knows Alice’s device
handover time, that is, whenAlicemoves fromone location to
next location.This attack by itself does not reveal privacy that
much, but when it is combined with other attackmodels, Bob
can dramatically increase profiling precision and canmultiply
the privacy attack damage.
2.5. Attack Scenario 1: Adversary Directly Connects to Mobile
Node. The simplest yet most impactful attack on Alice’s
privacy is that Bob can keep a live connection directly to
Alice’s mobile node device. Therefore, Bob will be able to
know exactly Alice’s network attachment location which can
be mapped to geolocation. Also Bob will know when Alice’s
address changes. Having that Bob not only knows the real-
time location of Alice but also can create a history timeline of
Alice’s movement. This is a combination of Attack Models 1,
3, and 4.
When Bob knows Alice’s real world identity, with Alice’s
real-time location and historical location information he can
launch all kinds of sophisticated attack or even threatening
Alice’s physical world safety. Without knowing Alice’s real
world identity Bob can still easily profile Alice by knowing
her unique location history. Note that Bob does not need
to be a friend of Alice to be able to trace her. Bob can be a
website Alice is used to visiting, or just a script embedded in
an advertisement.
2.6. Attack Scenario 2: Adversary Resolves Mobile Node’s
Address via a Location Service. Based on Scenario 1, assume
Alice enhances her security by deploying a local firewall on
her mobile node to refuse connection from Bob. This would
to some extent prevent Bob from acquiring real-time location
information of Alice. However, there could be some public
location service, such as DNS, that can be used to resolve
Alice’s identity to her location for Alice to be connected. Bob
can keep sending location resolution requests to this service
to collect Alice’s location history. This is a combination of
Attack Models 2 and 3.
Compared to Attack Scenario 1 Bob’s tracking capability
is limited: first Bob will not be able to get deterministic real-
time location of Alice since he cannot directly connect to her;
second since the location registration always lags behind and
is sometimes protected by throttling mechanism, Bob will
not perceive precise timing or even complete location history
of Alice. In this case it only accomplishes Attack Model 2.
When the registration service has access control and Bob is
not whitelisted to resolve Alice’s address, he will not be able
to track Alice. However, maintaining a whitelist is difficult
and expensive, as modern Internet host usually has tens or
hundreds of open connections to web servers and other hosts
at any moment. On the other hand, if Bob is allowed to
connect to Alice or allowed to resolve Alice’s location, Alice’s
exposure is no different than Attack Scenario 1.
2.7. Attack Scenario 3: Adversary Connects through Proxy
Moving along with Mobile Node. Alice can protect her loca-
tion privacy while keeping connectivity by sending/receiving
traffic through a proxy. In this case, Bob can communicate
with Alice at any time, but only the proxy location is exposed
to Bob. Bob will only observe proxy’s location history, and,
under most circumstances, Bob will not be able to detect
whether Alice is behind a proxy. This is a combination of
Attack Models 3 and 4.
A typical example is cellular data network. When Alice
uses the cellular network to access the Internet, usually Alice’s
mobile host will be assigned a private network address that is
routable within carrier’s network, and Alice will have to route
her traffic through her cellular carrier’s Internet gateway for
Internet access. For Bob, he will only see Internet gateway’s
network address as Alice’s exposed network address. In this
case, the carrier’s Internet gateway becomes a de facto proxy.
When Alice roams away new private network address will be
assigned. When this new private address is associated with
another Internet gateway which is usually close to the cell
Alice is in, Bob will observe connection interruption and
location change.
3. A Mobility Support System
Protecting Privacy
Our system is based on our previous design of Mobility
Support System (MSS) [13]. In this section we will briefly
describe system design and discuss how it can protect privacy
while providing mobility support efficiently.
3.1. Parties and Entities. There are three different parties in
the system: mobile node, peer node, and Mobility Service
Provider (MSP). Mobile node is the mobile device hosting
mobile user’s identity and applications. It roams across
different networks and continuously communicates with its
peers. During its movement, mobile node keeps changing its
network attach point and exposes different public network
address (such as public IP address) at times. While mobile
node receives new network addresses, its network location
may shift small distance (e.g., handover across a cell) or
shift relative large distance (such as switching to a different
service provider or performing a vertical handover). Most
of the time the geolocation of the old and new address is
relatively close, though the radius can be from street blocks
to adjacent cities. All mobile nodes will have MSS client
deployed, which handles all incoming and outgoing traffic.
Connections between mobile node and proxies are identity
based, and all traffics are tunneled through these connections.
MSS client daemon book keeps all connectionsmade through
it to other peers and its connections toMSP control plane and
also maintains a table for all proxies it connects to.
Peer nodes are Internet host on the other end of the
connection. They can be a website, an ordinary host, or
another mobile node. They can be categorized as either MSS
deployed host that is mobility aware and connects based on
identity to proxy or legacy host that only connects to IP
address and locates mobile node by DNS name.
MSP manages a fleet of servers, called Virtual Routers,
that are dynamically allocated and released from public cloud
service provider’s data centers. Each Virtual Router can host
multiple proxies that relay different mobile nodes’ traffic, up
to one Virtual Router’s resource limit. One proxy only serves
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Figure 1: Virtual Router hosting proxies.
one mobile node at a time, though it can handle multiple
traffic streams (or tunnels) for same mobile node. Proxy also
functions as profile server that serves mobile node’s profile
or DNS name lookups. For each mobile node, its proxies
together create an overlay network to propagate control
signals. Figure 1 shows a Virtual Router hosting multiple
proxies.
At any moment mobile node has a master proxy which
is created or designated at a location close to mobile node.
This proxy could be used for relaying traffic with low privacy
concern connections or close by peer nodes, but its major
tasks are to manage the proxy overlay network and delegate
communication between mobile node and SDN controller.
When mobile node moves away from master proxy, a new
master proxy will be created to take over the task.
3.2. Proxy Allocation and Deallocation. The proxy servers
handle both outgoing and incoming connections. The out-
going connection is initialized by mobile node sending
request to SDN controller through master proxy. SDN
controller will then select the best candidate from mobile
node’s current proxy fleet that has minimum communication
cost to peer node or create new proxy limited by current
resource availability and customer’s SLA.The Virtual Router,
which is assigned to host this proxy, then just chooses a
random outgoing port and uses its own address to create
connections to peer node. Then it instructs the selected
proxy to update/initialize and take over the connection
while waiting for tunnel opening request from mobile node.
Incoming connection means proxy must listen on a given
port for incoming connection requests. Therefore, incoming
connections are exclusive, especially for legacy connection
since one specific listening port can be exposed for only one
mobile node on a Virtual Router. Listing proxy servers must
be created priorly and are dynamically adjusted according
to recent address queries, amortized management algorithm,
and also the historical statistic. Furthermore, because the
resource is scarce, listing proxy is more expensive than
outgoing proxy and popular ports (such as 80) are more
expensive than nonpopular ones.When creating connections
to peer nodes, proxy can create mobility aware connection
or legacy connection depending on peer node’s type. In the
case of mobility aware connection proxy can migrate live
connections to another proxy, while for the legacy connection
proxy must keep serving it until it closes.
When all connections of a proxy are closed, it becomes
a candidate for removal. The decision is made by master
proxy, given the current load and topology of all mobile
node’s proxy, user’s SLA, and dampening algorithm. Once a
proxy is removed, master proxy reports to SDN controller
and the resource on corresponding Virtual Router is freed
up for other customers. Similarly, MSP manages its Virtual
Router fleet at a larger scope with the same strategy. It
removes unoccupied Virtual Router or creates new ones to
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maintain a healthy load ratio and global presence. Public
cloud enables this architecture that Virtual Routers can be
created/removed in almost all the main areas around the
world, in the manner of on-demand that Virtual Router can
be allocated or removed within minutes dynamically.
3.3. Proxy Overlay Network. For a mobile user, MSP creates a
proxy overlay network on top of all involved Virtual Routers.
This proxy network only consists of proxy servers for this
particular mobile user. Only master proxy exchanges control
signal with mobile node. Proxy servers communicate among
themselves to aggregate metrics into master proxy. Over-
lay network topology is self-adapted, and adding/removing
proxy is requested by master proxy and controlled by SDN-
style controller.
All proxy servers connected through overlay network
actively sync copies of mobile node’s profile and location
information, even if when they do not have live connection
with mobile node (as “standby proxy”). Therefore, every
proxy server can serve lookup and connection request
for mobile node independently. Periodically, proxy servers
exchange traffic, connection, and lookup statistics. Further-
more, such statistics are summarized at a master proxy and
then reported to the MSP controller.
Each mobile node has its own proxy overlay network.
Different proxy networks would share the same Virtual
Routers as long as there is no resource contention (e.g., a
host can only listen on TCP port 80 for legacy clients for
a single mobile user). However, different proxy networks
do not communicate nor know others existence as their
signaling and data plane are completely isolated from each
other. On the other hand, Virtual Router knows all proxies
deployed on it and their corresponding proxy network IDs.
MSP controller has a global picture of every proxy overlay
network and every Virtual Routers.
Figure 2 shows an example scenario: MSP’s SDN con-
troller has allocated three proxies for a single mobile user,
and all communication to mobile host is through these
proxies.The three proxies form a virtual overlay network that
replicatesmobile user’s profile and aggregates its performance
metrics. Meanwhile, proxies are exposed as mobile user’s
identity so the mobile user can accept incoming connections
at any time from any other Internet endpoints, no matter
legacy or not.
Master proxy needs to periodically review the overlay
network to keep a good balance or running cost, perfor-
mance, and availability. It also needs to prepare to compensate
for potential future traffic. Once it determines the overlay
network topology needs to change (without active action
frommobile node) such as adding, deprecating, or removing
proxy it will report to SDN controller.
3.4. Multihoming. Since at any moment a mobile node can
be behind a few proxies, by nature MSS mobile node is
considered multihoming. Its peers generally will only see one
exposed network location of the mobile node, but it is also
possible that a peer node connects amobile node through two
or more different proxies, especially when these connections
are set up long time apart.
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3.5. Both Behind Proxies. A special scenario is that both end
hosts aremobile nodes behind proxies. Additionally theymay
belong to different MSPs which additionally limits the data
to optimize performance. When two mobile nodes belong to
the sameMSP, since MSP controller knows locations of both,
MSP will choose one “pivot” point between them to optimize
for performance. If one mobile node knows the other end is
also amobile node, itmay leverage that to detect how far away
the other mobile node is away from it. To mitigate that, MSP
controller must set a lower bound of route path length, to
avoid choosing a pivot point too close to amobile node.When
mobile nodes belong to different MSPs, both only exposed
proxy to the other side, and the traffic will go through two
proxies. It could result in an inefficient trombone routing
unlessMSPs can cooperate to share some location knowledge.
3.6. Metrics. There are three major metric types that MSS
system optimizes for: privacy, cost, and performance. In the
following equations, we use 𝑚, 𝑛, and 𝑝 to represent mobile
node, peer node, and proxy server; use 𝑀, 𝑁, and 𝑃 to
represent the corresponding set.
Privacy. To quantify network location privacy protection in
end-to-end communication scenario, we propose two met-
rics: distance and timing. After all, privacy can be quantified
as the uncertainty of the mobile node’s location observed
from peer side. So in the case when peer believes that the
exposed location is the real location, the uncertainty is 100%.
However, since we cannot quantify how much peer node
believes the mobile node’s exposed location, we will always
assume that peer node knows mobile node is behind a proxy,
and the proxy is on a strategic point that will not introduce
unreasonable latency penalty, that is, at some point along the
route between mobile node and peer node. (Our metrics can
also quantify privacy and performance of artificially away
proxy aswell; i.e., proxy is selected far away frommobile node
and peer node, to create an illusion of being away for peer
node, increasing the performance penalty.)
Distance, 𝜆, is measured by the distance of exposed
network location and the actual network location of mobile
node. Distance stands for two different types of measure-
ment in MSS: network distance and geographical distance.
Network distance can be measured by network hops of end-
to-end connection, or hops of network segments such as
Autonomous System (AS). Geographical distance is mea-
sured by the distance of corresponding geographic locations
of exposed network address and actual network address.
This metric bears similarity to distance error described in
[14, 15]. For example, a mobile node in New York City
with IP address 128.59.a.b talks with a peer node in Los
Angeles with IP address 128.97.x.y, via a proxy server in
Indiana with IP address 129.79.m.n. The network distance is
the hop distance between 128.59.a.b and 129.79.m.n, and the
geographic distance is about 700 miles between New York
City and Indianapolis. Distance measures how far away the
exposed network location is from mobile host’s real network
location. It is a derived metric rather than simply counting
number of hops because more hops do not necessarily mean
larger network distance. Since adversary can derive network
organizations and geographic location fromnetwork address,
we define distance as how different the exposed network
address is in terms of relative geographical distance, which
is derived from the mapping of network address to registered
geographical locations.
In general the larger the distance, the better the privacy.
We use function dis(𝑥, 𝑦) to represent the approximate
location between network attach points 𝑥 and 𝑦. Then for a
given combination of mobile node (𝑚), peer node (𝑛), and
proxy server (𝑝), location privacy 𝜆𝑚, 𝑛, 𝑝 can be evaluated
as follows:
𝜆𝑚, 𝑛, 𝑝 =
dis (𝑚, 𝑝)
dis (𝑚, 𝑛)
. (1)
On the other hand, the performance overhead 𝜙 is quantified
as follows:
𝜙𝑚, 𝑛, 𝑝 = distance (𝑚, 𝑝) + distance (𝑝, 𝑛)
− dis (𝑚, 𝑛) .
(2)
𝜆 can be equal to 0, between 0 and 1, equal to 1, or greater than
1.
(i) When no proxy is leveraged, which means mobile
node’s location is directly exposed, then dis(𝑚, 𝑝) = 0
and 𝜆 = 0.
(ii) When proxy is located somewhere between mobile
node and peer node, 0 < 𝜆 < 1.
(iii) When proxy is located next to peer node, 𝜆 = 1. In
this case overhead 𝜙 is minimized to 0, and 𝜆 is 1.
(iv) When proxy is located far away from being between
mobile node and peer node, 𝜆 > 1.
Assuming that all proxies a mobile node connects have
the same distance dis(𝑚, 𝑝), then the proxies form a circle
around the mobile node. dis(𝑚, 𝑝) = dis(𝑝, 𝑛) means peer
node happens to be on the circle as well. According to our
equation all proxies have the same 𝜆. On the other hand, the
proxy which locates at the same location of peer node has
minimum 𝜙, 0.
Timing is the metric describing how correlated are the
inferred and the real movements of the mobile host (i.e.,
changing network attach point). When no protection mech-
anism is applied, the adversary can know exactly when the
mobile host moves from one location to another. Timing
is measured by two types of correlations: number of real
network address changes versus exposed network address
changes during whole communication and difference of
timestampbetween real address changes and exposed address
changes. The larger the correlation, the better the privacy.
Timing privacymust be evaluated for a period of time: during
a time range, we assume mobile node moves 𝑖 times and
proxy changes 𝑗 times. Function 𝛿(𝑥, 𝑦) is used to represent
the timestamp difference between events 𝑥 and 𝑦. Then for
a mobile node 𝑚 went through a series of network address
change events 𝐸𝑚 while its peer node 𝑛 observed another
series of change of proxy server events𝐸𝑝.Then for amatched
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mobile nodemove𝐸𝑚𝑖 and proxy server change𝐸
𝑝
𝑗 , the timing
metric is evaluated as the time difference of these two events:
𝛿𝐸𝑚
𝑖
,𝐸
𝑝
𝑗
= 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑡
𝑚
𝑖 − 𝑡
𝑝
𝑗
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 , (3)
where 𝑡 is event’s timestamp.When evaluating timing privacy
we always use the best match of mobile node move events
versus proxy server change events, to assume peer node has
the best knowledge to leverage that correlation. In another
word, we assume the worst case for mobile node is that each
of its proxy server changes will be associated with its most
recent move. Given that assumption and our 𝛿 equation, the
overall timing privacy can be evaluated as the sum of
Δ𝑚,𝑛,𝑝 =
∑𝑖∈𝐸𝑚,𝑗∈𝐸𝑝
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨time (𝑥, 𝑦)
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
𝑗
. (4)
The higher value of Δ𝑚,𝑛,𝑝, the better timing privacy. The
lower bound of Δ𝑚,𝑛,𝑝 is 0 that for each mobile node move,
peer can detect its proxy server change at exactly the same
time, that is, equivalent to no proxy server. The upper bound
is ∞ that when proxy server does not change at all, the
exposed address becomes completely static.
Cost. Cost is measured by the operational cost for MSP.
Overall MSP needs to pay two parts of operational cost: the
cost of running SDN control plane and costs of running
dynamic allocated Virtual Routers. The former is relatively
static, so it is not considered as optimization goal in this
research scope. The latter is determined by the number of
proxy servers, their locations (different data center can have
different pricing), and bandwidth proxy servers consumed.
In a real world deployment, a cloud service provider usually
offers various size virtual hosts for different price. However,
since the performance-cost ratio of different host type is
similar and MSP can find a sweet spot host type, in this
research we will assume single host type to simplify the
scenario. On mobile node side the cost is associated with
the number of proxy server hours it used and bandwidths
it consumed. Additionally, mobile node pays higher price
for listening proxy server as it represents a more constraint
resource, listening port. The operational cost of MSP is
𝐶 = ∑ costserver + costtraffic. (5)
And the cost a mobile node consumes is
𝑐MN = cost𝐿 ∗ hour𝐿 + cost𝑂 ∗ hour𝑂 +∑ costtraffic, (6)
where cost is the price of a proxy server per hour use, cost𝐿 is
the cost for listening proxy, and cost𝑂 is the cost for outgoing
proxy.
Performance. Performance is measured by communication
latency and bandwidth, two factors that are the most per-
ceptible for mobile node’s experience. Latency is measured
by the Round Trip Time (RTT) between mobile node and its
peer node, on which proxy location has the most influence.
Bandwidth is measured by the highest throughput mobile
node can get from proxy node. It is limited by the aggregated
traffic bandwidth at a proxy versus proxy node’s available
physical bandwidth and processing power. In general proxy
node has high and stable physical bandwidth and processing
power that is large enough to serve a number of Mobile
Node’s concurrent uses. When proxy node is overloaded
mobile node can always be directed to another proxy node
in the same data center so bandwidth optimization is based
on resource contention and it iss mostly coupled with cost
optimization. Latency is then the single parameter of evalu-
ating performance in this research. Latency is only evaluated
on live connections between mobile node and peer node via
proxy servers. Performance is evaluated by proxy overhead,
which is the difference between the RTT directly connected
and the RTT connected via proxy.
𝜇 = RTT (𝑚, 𝑝) + RTT (𝑝, 𝑛) − RTT (𝑚, 𝑛) . (7)
3.7. Protection against Attacks. MSS system enables ubiqui-
tous mobility support while protectingmobile node’s privacy.
For the four attack models we described the following:
(i) Defending direct connection attack: all connections
are indirect and through Proxy. So Bob will never be
able to infer Alice’s network address while being able
to talk with her.
(ii) Defending location registry attack: all location reg-
istries only point to Alice’s proxy locations. Even if
when Bob can acquire multiple proxies’ locations, he
cannot infer Alice’s location since these proxies are set
up near to Alice’s peer rather than Alice.
(iii) Defending historical location attack: Bob cannot
acquire a list of Alice’s real network location history
either through communication with Alice or through
registry.
(iv) Defending location change timing attack: Bob cannot
directly detect when Alice changes network location
as the connection between him and proxy is always
unchanged.
4. Simulation and Discussion
We run simulations to compare MSS versus other models.
The comparison is based on the view of individual customer’s
privacy and performance metrics when one customer moves
while communicating with its peers. Besides MSS model,
other models are as follows:
(1) Without proxy: this represents an ordinary Internet
mobile user always uses direct connections.
(2) Typical VPN user: we simulate by keeping 1 static
proxy server selected around the middle of the opti-
mal router between mobile node and its first peer
node (within 2 hops). It does give favor to first peer
node but statistically it does not make difference if we
choose other peer node for simulation.
(3) Typical cell data mobile user: we simulate by keep-
ing a proxy server that follows mobile node move
(randomly picked within 2 hops of mobile node’s
8 Mobile Information Systems
Without proxy
MSS proxy network
Typical VPN
Typical cellular
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 90
Time
0
0.2
0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
Lo
ca
tio
n 
pr
iv
ac
y
Figure 3: Comparison of location privacy metric for different
models.
attaching point and reselects when mobile node’s
access point is moving away from attaching point).
In real world network distance (either hop, latency, or
AS distance) is harder to quantify and does not reflect
geographical distance well, because network addresses, such
as IP, are usually not uniformly distributed or segmented.
Fewer network hops do not always mean shorter geographic
distance. On the other hand, geographic distance mapped
from IP address is easier to quantify and relatively reliable.
Even though there are cases that IP address incorrectly
mapped to wrong geographical locations (mostly depending
on IP database), in reality, this does not impair privacy.There-
fore, in our simulation, we will assume all IP addresses can be
correctly mapped so our evaluation can rely on geographical
distance of network attaching point for comparison.
For simulation, we generate a 1024 node network using
BRITE [16] (using BRITE’s AS only generation tool and
takingAS as a network node) to emulate a segment of Internet
topology.Mobile node and peer node are randomly placed on
it. The 1024 nodes are randomly distributed in a 2D 1000 by
1000 points plane, and their 2D distance is considered as their
geographic distance. Mobile node performs a random walk
in 2D plane and connects to the nearest node as its Internet
attaching point. During each mobile node movement at ten
time spots, we randomly select a peer node talking to it and
measure the privacy metric and performance overhead. We
generate traces of 100 mobile nodes and compare the average
of mobile node’s metrics, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 shows location privacymetrics where “no proxy”
metric is always 0 as expected. “MSS proxy network” metric
quickly increases along time as new proxy is added to proxy
network. It is capped around 0.88 as we constrained number
of proxy servers by the running cost we artificially set, but
the system still is able to optimize performance. “Typical
VPN” metric appears to be relatively stable because metrics
are averaged out but for individual mobile node metric are
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Figure 4: Comparison of performance overhead in hops for
different models.
spiky. “Typical cellular” metric shows that it does protect
location privacy to some extent but is very limited. The
real world metric for a cellular user could be worse though
cellular network Internet gateway could be closer in terms of
geolocation.
Figure 4 shows corresponding performance penalty of
using proxy in terms of extra network hops. “No proxy”
metric of course is always 0. “MSS proxy network” metric
similarly improves quickly for the first few communications
and then is limited by the number of proxies. “Typical VPN”
metric starts low as our simulation favor first peer node but
then quickly goes up. Similarly the averaged metric looks
stable but individual mobile node’s metric is spiky. “Typical
cellular” metric is better than MSS proxy network as we
assume cellular Internet gateway is always close by. On the
other hand, MSS proxy allocation algorithm still has lots of
headroom to optimize and can also leverage prediction from
mined historical data.
Due to the implementation of this simulation in which
one proxy is static for existing connection for both “MSS
proxy network” and “typical VPN,” both their timing privacy
metric is∞. “No proxy”metric remains at 0, and “proxy close
tomobile node” also remains at 0.The former is expected, but
the latter is a little bit stretched where in this simulation each
change of proxy server happens exactly the same time when
mobile node moves, due to our algorithm and simulation
design. However, the difference here is big enough that proxy
make mobile node appears to be static, but the other two
highly correlate to mobile node’s actual moving timestamp.
Figure 5 shows corresponding operation cost in terms
of unit time use of proxy. “No proxy” and “typical cellular”
metric are always 0 since they did not use any proxy
server. “Typical VPN” metric remains at 1 because in our
simulation we assume there is always only 1 VPN server.
“MSS proxy network”metric shows interesting result though.
The cost quickly went up as more proxies are leveraged
and finally capped around 3.8 as in our simulation we
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Figure 5: Comparison of operation cost for different models.
set the upper bound of proxy allocation is 4. During the
same time from Figure 3 we can see privacy metric also
correspondingly quickly went up as those new proxies were
likely to be allocated at relative “edge” location and therefore
improved distance privacy greatly. Performance was also
quickly optimized along with increase of proxies, although
there was an interesting churn that happened at time 4.
Based on analysis our theory is that because the call pattern
we generated is uniformly random, a large portion of new
allocated proxies at time 3 does not serve request at time
4 well as they were allocated away from both mobile node
and peer nodes. After that proxy allocation is then adjusted
to adapt; the performance overhead went down again and
remained relatively stable.
Another group of simulation we performed is a compari-
son between the different maximum allowed Proxies; that is,
we allowed maximum 2, 4, 6, and 8 proxies for each mobile
node in simulation and compared result as shown in Figures
6 and 7. Figures 6 and 7 both show that when allowing more
proxies both performance and privacy improved. On the
other hand, the percentage of improvement starts to decrease
when allowedmaximumproxies aremore than 4 and became
less significant when allowed proxies increased to 8.
When looking at the corresponding operation cost from
Figure 8 we can see that the number of proxies increased
gradually.Whenmore proxies were created, allocation of new
proxies became less aggressive. For the simulation iteration
allowing 8 maximum proxies, only 84.6% mobile nodes had
8 proxies setup at the end. This suggests that when there is
enough number of proxies adding more does not necessarily
mean better performance and privacy, at least for the given
simulation setup and algorithm implementation. Actually for
the simulation iterations of having 6 and 8 proxies, mobile
node’s cost/performance ratio dropped compared to itera-
tions having 4 proxies. In other words the simulation result
also suggests that having 4 maximum proxies is the sweet
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Figure 6: Comparison of location privacy metric for different
allowed max proxies.
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Figure 7: Comparison of performance overhead in hops for
different allowed max proxies.
spot, balancing the operation cost, performance overhead,
and privacy.
5. Related Works
Privacy issue caused by mobility, especially location, has
been well studied. de Montjoye et al. [17] found that from
a large set of anonymous movement data, using four data
points of hourly data can identify 95% unique users. Given
the identified movement pattern of this identified user,
they can even construct a history of this user’s locations
from the anonymized data set. Ma et al. reached the same
conclusion [7]. This clearly shows location information, even
after anonymization, can greatly threaten a mobile user’s
privacy when it can be collected by the adversary. Cloud
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Figure 8: Comparison of operation cost for different allowed max
proxies.
computing and big data just make this exploit more available
and accessible [18]. However, without proper protection, a
mobile host cannot hide its location since its network location
will be exposed to any peer it communicates and the network
location is an approximation of its physical location.
One major research area is to protect against user profil-
ing from Location Based Service (LBS) while still being able
to use it [19–21].Wernke et al. [22] surveyed different identity
protection types and common mechanisms to protect and
attack privacy. Usually, a compromise between quality of
service and privacy is optimized by manipulating location
reporting frequency, precision, or both [23]. For example,
Shokri et al. [24, 25] designed an approach to hide user’s
profile against adversary by solving it as Bayesian Stackelberg
game. Primault et al. proposedmechanism to reduce profiling
exposure, by hiding POI where the user stops, and also let
user exchange their trajectories when meeting [26]. On the
other hand, research work also shows obfuscated location
data and can improve location privacy but cannot stop
adversary to infer relative precise Point Of Interests (POI)
[27].
Another focusing area is to increase anonymity of col-
lected user location data [11], limiting shared location infor-
mation, or evaluating privacy exposure level before sharing
location data [12]. On the other hand, there are research
works pointing out that because humanmobility trace is very
unique [17], even completed anatomized data can still be
used to extract patterns and identify individuals [7–9]. So as
long as relative location andmovement are collected, location
privacy can be compromised to certain context.
MobilityFirst [28, 29] is a proposed new Internet architec-
ture that emphasizes mobility support, comparing to existing
Internet architecture. Privacy and communication security
are one major challenge for MobilityFirst. Access control is
proposed to be applied to MobilityFirst so that only allowed
network entities can contact a host or resolve its network
locations [30].
Research works done show that people care about their
location privacy but also are willing to trade it off for financial
benefit, for example, lowering car insurance payment by
exposing location to insurer [31].
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we discussed privacy issues a communication
connection of Internet mobile user could expose and corre-
sponding attack model. Based on that we proposed a design
to protect it with a dynamic distributed proxy network,
built upon our previously designedMobility Support System.
An Internet user can receive ubiquitous Internet mobility
support while network location privacy being well protected,
with a marginal performance overhead and minimized oper-
ation cost. Our preliminary simulation results show that our
design meets our expectation, and there is still headroom to
optimize for performance and cost in the future.
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